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Abstract.  We analyze the determinants of prices and frequencies in the interurban bus services (IBS) 
market. Drawing on data collected from a sample of routes in six large European countries, we find 
that intramodal competition is based on frequencies while intermodal competition is based on prices. 
Furthermore, we provide evidence of the regressive nature of the IBS in Europe by showing that 
routes with low-income endpoints face higher prices. We also find significant price differences 
between countries, which can be attributed to differences in their respective regulatory systems.  
 























Interurban bus services (IBS), unlike other modes of transport, such as air and high-speed rail (HSR) 
travel, do not typically attract the attention of the media or academia. Yet, interurban buses offer a 
number of advantages. For example, they cover similar routes, usually at lower prices, to those 
provided by these alternatives modes and, moreover, there is no need to invest in new, costly 
infrastructure to operate a route, as is obviously the case with HSR (DfT, 2004a). According to 
Eurostat data, in 2013, passenger buses and coaches accounted for 9.2% of inland passenger transport 
in the EU-28, while trains accounted for 7.4%.1  
The prices charged by this mode are especially attractive to lower income groups, including the 
young, the elderly and those without access to a car.2 In this regard, Balcombe et al. (2004) calculate 
that interurban bus users have a lower value of time than that of train users. 
Promoting the use of IBS also helps reduce the congestion caused by cars (DfT, 2004a) and air 
pollution levels (Heil and Pargal, 1991; Stanley and Watkiss, 2003; Chapman, 2007). All in all, IBS 
ensure that there are fewer vehicles on the roads. Indeed, Abuhamoud et al. (2002) claim that a 
double-decker bus is a sustainable mode of transport and can replace up to 50 other motorized 
vehicles. Note also that the relationship between buses and road safety outcomes is complex but 
recent studies suggest that the marginal external accidents cost per passenger kilometer of buses is 
lower than that of cars (Sen, 2010; Rizzi and De La Maza, 2017).3 
                                                          
1 Note here that Eurostat data do not differentiate between local and longer distance bus. 
2 Surveys report that 40% of regular bus users in the UK and 50% in Greece live in households without access 
to a car (European Commission 2009). 
3 Accident cost is a function of accident rate and accident severity (Jansson, 1994). Severity is influenced by 
speed and rate by the number of vehicles. A greater presence of buses on the roads may decrease the number 
of accidents as they can each substitute many cars. However, more buses could increase the severity of 
accidents if they help to increase the speed of cars on the road.  
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Studies about the performance of bus services have usually focused on urban transportation. A 
typical concern here has been to determine the effect of ownership on efficiency. For example, 
Albalate et al. (2012) analyzed urban bus transportation in the city of Barcelona (Spain), concluding 
that the most efficient way to deliver urban bus services was via partial privatization. Vining and 
Boardman (1992) found privately owned bus companies to be more efficient than their public 
counterparts, while Jørgensen et al. (1997) found no differences between public and private 
companies in Norway. Other studies, including Borcherding et al. (1982) and Scheffler et al. (2013), 
report that a more important determinant of efficiency is the presence or otherwise of competition on 
a route rather than the ownership structure of the bus companies.4 Further to this, some recent studies 
do not find significant differences in the costs of urban bus lines between those operated under 
competitively tendered contracts and those operated under performance-based negotiated contracts 
(Fillipini et al., 2015; Mouwen and van Ommeren, 2016). A common explanation for that result is 
that the threat of competitive tendering is sufficient to put pressure on the behavior of operators. An 
extensive literature review can be found in Ibarra-Rojas et al. (2015). 
Interurban bus services, particularly regarding competition and the effects of liberalization, has 
not been widely studied. Van de Velde (2009, 2014) reviewed the interurban bus regulatory systems 
being operated in Europe, and found that competition in the market, rather than tendering concessions 
(competing for the market), was the most frequent form of competition in Europe. Knorr and Lueg-
Arndt (2016) and Dürr and Hüschelrath (2017) provide data that show an important increase in the 
number of routes served by the German interurban bus market just after its deregulation. For the same 
market, Dürr et al. (2016) show price increases on duopoly routes as a consequence of the merger 
between two big players. Augustin et al. (2014) compare the German and US markets suggesting the 
                                                          
4 Taylor and Ciechanski (2008) analyze changes in ownership involving Poland’s road transport firms after 
1990 and they conclude that state ownership remains dominant.  
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higher potential of the former due to its lower average distances.5 Blayac and Bougette (2017) find 
that the liberalization of French long-distance bus services has had positive effects in terms of fares, 
number of operators and frequencies. Aarhaug and Fearnley (2016) document a steady traffic growth 
in the inter-urban market in Norway after its liberalization. Finally, Alexandersson et al (2010) argue 
that the Norwegian market is more developed and efficient compared to its Swedish counterpart. 
Other studies compare IBS with the services provided by other transport modes, especially rail. 
For example, Bataille and Steinmetz (2013) examined the effect of introducing interurban buses to 
compete with trains, while Ahern and Tapley (2008) compared interurban rail and bus passenger 
preferences in Ireland by combining revealed and stated preference models. Finally, Rojo et al. (2012) 
analyze which variables affect the probability that a traveler will use a bus or a car for an inter-city 
journey, by applying different discrete choice models in a dataset based on survey results from a 
region in Spain. They show that prices, frequencies and the duration of the journey have a relevant 
influence on modal choice.  
We seek to add to this literature by undertaking an empirical analysis of the determinants of prices 
and frequencies in the interurban bus market through a comparison across countries. To do this, we 
collected data on routes from a number of large European countries, including France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Data for the main variables are from May 2015. We 
focus our attention specifically on the presence of different transportation modes on the routes and 
the factors characterizing the firms’ intramodal competition as well as the regulatory system in 
operation in each country. Additionally, we analyze whether prices relate to income levels at the route 
endpoints. 
                                                          
5 Walter et al. (2011) analyze the inter-urban bus market in Germany before the liberalization took place. By 
analyzing demand and supply in the long-distance transportation market, they predicted that the share of bus 
services after the liberalization could be about 5%.  
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The main results from this analysis indicate that bus prices are lower on routes with richer 
endpoints; thus, we provide some evidence of a regressive fare-setting scheme in the countries 
examined. We also find that in the interurban bus market intramodal competition is based on 
frequencies while intermodal competition is based on prices. Finally, we find substantial differences 
across the countries examined, which could be attributed to differences in the regulatory model in 
operation in each country.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and outlines the 
methodology employed in analyzing the determinants of prices and frequencies in the interurban bus 
market. A priori expectations of the explanatory variables are considered in section 3, while the 
estimate results are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Sample 
The sample used in the empirical analysis includes observations for the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Italy, France, Spain and Sweden. Since both the availability and quality of data differ across countries, 
we opted to include the five largest EU Member States plus Sweden; the countries with the best data 
available. 
Our unit of observation for the empirical analysis is the routes linking two endpoints. For each 
country, we include 45 potential links; the result of interconnecting each country’s ten largest cities. 
In each case, the origin is the city with the larger population. Thus, Germany is the country offering 
most bus routes (with a total of 416), followed by Spain (38), the United Kingdom (37), Italy (25), 
                                                          
6  In the case of the four remaining routes, two – Düsseldorf-Essen and Dortmund-Essen – link cities that are 
less than 50 km apart. According to the German model, interurban buses cannot operate on a route that is under 
50 km.  
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Sweden (23) and France (13). This gives us 177 interurban bus services for a total of 270 potential 
links. 
In our analysis, we only consider direct routes (but include those that make stops en route); after 
all, identifying all the indirect routes is hardly feasible. By using this strategy, we ensure that our 
eventual sample is more closely comparable across countries. Having identified which bus company 
(or companies) provides a service on a given route, we then visit their website(s) and complete all the 
steps required to book a ticket. In this way we obtain the data for our dependent variables, i.e. the 
mean price and total frequency at the route level. The duration of each journey is also obtained 
directly from these websites. Only in the case of Spain did we find information regarding bus 
capacity, which would have been a relevant variable to include in the model had it been available 
across the countries.  
There are often different routes available for linking up a pair of cities but the bus companies do 
not provide these details; therefore, we have opted to use the fastest route provided by Google Maps 
to measure the total distance between two cities. Once we know the length of the journey and the 
journey time, we can easily calculate the average speed for each route and determine one of our main 
dependent variables, i.e. price per kilometer. Data for the rest of the variables included in the analysis 
were obtained from Eurostat.  
The main characteristics of the regulatory system being operated in each of the countries included 
in our analysis are summarized below using information provided by the European Commission 
(2009), Van de Velde (2009) and Barbadillo et al. (2014). 
In the United Kingdom, the sector underwent a liberalization process with the introduction of the 
1980 Transport Act and the privatization of the National Bus Company, now National Express (NE)7. 
                                                          
7 White and Robbins (2012) analyze the competitive strategies followed by NE to respond to the competitive 
pressure imposed by Megabus.  
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However, it was not until 2003 that NE’s main competitor, Megabus, entered the market. In the 
United Kingdom, bus companies are free to choose the routes they operate, the frequency of services 
offered and the fares charged, and the degree of regulation is minimal. The Traffic Commissioners 
guarantee that there are no collusive and anti-competitive agreements among the UK’s agents.   
The Swedish market has also been liberalized, however the number of services remains low. 
Deregulation was initiated in 1993 and terminated in 1999, with firms being allowed to operate even 
if their presence was reported as being detrimental to train services. As in the UK, firms are free to 
fix routes, frequencies and fares. Swebus and Nettbus are the leading firms in the Swedish interurban 
bus market.  
In Italy, the system has been liberalized since 2005. Yet, the oligopolistic power of the traditional 
firms; the complexity and discretion entailed in the authorization of licenses; and, the competition 
with what are typically subsidized train services, all represent major entry barriers for new firms. The 
corporate group made up of Baltour, Sena and Eurolines dominates the market, although there are 
many local operators. 
In Spain, the IBS were under state control until 1990. Today, however, firms compete for the 
market through competitive tendering. The length of the concessions (between 8 and 20 years) and 
the fact that “concession competitions favor incumbents” (European Commission 2009, p 52) 
represent a significant entry barrier for new firms. The country’s largest operator is ALSA. 
Until 2011, bus firms in France were not allowed to operate services on routes covered by the 
national railway company (SNCF), which meant the IBS were marginal. Although the market was 
opened up between 2012 and 2013, the level of usage of interurban bus services has been much lower 
than in countries such as Spain. In fact, in our sample, France has by far the fewest interurban bus 
connections, followed by Sweden and Italy. Note here that our data are not able to capture the 
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influence of the liberalization of the long-distance bus market in France that took place in the summer 
2015.  
Finally, until 2012, Germany operated a very similar regulatory system to the one used in France. 
The policy was designed to promote and protect rail transport and, in general, prohibited IBS. 
However, in 2013 with the passing of the “Personenbeförderungsgesetz”, the authorities liberalized 
the market. Today, any firm is free to operate in the market as long as the distance of the route is at 
least 50 km and the journey time is more than an hour. Postbus, Flixbus and Berlinlinenbus are the 
main operators in Germany.8  
For illustrative purposes, Table 1 summarizes the number of IBS routes and their daily frequencies 
in each of the six countries. The second column lists the firms offering IBS in each country. We also 
show the number of routes that each company operates and the total daily frequencies, in the third 
and fifth columns, respectively. Note that we could have missed out smaller operators so that more 
services may exist. 
The table allows us to determine whether differences in countries’ regulatory systems are 
translated into different levels of IBS provision. By way of example, let us take the cases of Spain 
and the United Kingdom, two countries operating quite distinct regulatory systems. As explained 
above, Spanish firms compete for the market through competitive tendering while UK firms freely 
compete in the market. In the case of Spain, we find bus services operating on 38 routes (from a 
possible 45) and the sum of the daily frequencies on these routes is 229. Of these 38 routes, ALSA 
controls 28, which means one firm provides 73.7% of the IBS in Spain. Moreover, in terms of daily 
                                                          
8 Knorr and Lueg-Arndt (2016) provide some data on the evolution of the German market for intercity bus 
services in the two years after the liberalization. They show a rapid growth in terms of the number of lines 
operated, the passenger volume and the number of buses in operation on scheduled services. They also observe 
a consolidation trend in the sectors through mergers and exits. 
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frequency, the firm controls 81.7% of the total market, offering 187 of the 229 journeys operated each 
day in Spain. 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
 
In the case of the United Kingdom, 51.4% of the routes (but only 13.3% of the total daily 
frequency) are offered solely by NE, while the remaining 48.6% (86.7% of the total daily frequency) 
are offered both by NE and Megabus (note, the label 2 (or 3) is used whenever 2 (or 3) firms operate 
services on the same route). Column seven shows that on those routes operated by both firms, NE 
offers a slightly higher frequency than that offered by Megabus (258 vs 191). Thus, in the UK, NE is 
responsible for 63.15% of daily journeys, i.e. six out of ten buses offering interurban services belong 
to NE9. So, while it is evident that the number of firms operating in Spain is higher than in the UK (6 
vs 2), the level of competition in Spain is considerably lower, given that one firm is responsible for 
more than 80% of the country’s daily frequency.  
 All in all, Table 1 allows us to identify differences between the countries with regard to the 
number of routes operated, the daily frequency of services, the number of firms providing any given 
service and, ultimately, the level of competition in each country.   
 
2.2. Variables 
The dependent variables in our analysis are prices per kilometer and frequencies. In comparing 
prices across the six countries, we introduce a purchasing power parity (PPP) factor and divide the 
price per kilometer by the corresponding PPP index. In so doing, we obtain a more comparable 
                                                          
9 These results are not, of course, applicable for the whole country, but refer only to the routes interconnecting 
the ten largest cities in the UK (see earlier explanation). 
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variable than current market prices10. Prices and frequencies correspond to 12 May 201511 and they 
were collected one month in advance.  
As in other transport sectors (including air and rail), the prices for IBS are not uniform and may 
vary for several reasons, including demand, day of booking, etc. For this reason, we identify three 
different prices per service: the price for the earliest departure, the lowest price and the highest price. 
In our equations, we use the earliest departure price since this seems to be the most uniform, while 
the cheapest and most expensive fares tend to vary greatly depending on the time of departure. 
However, we also present the results when using the lowest and highest prices as the dependent 
variable, in the Appendix, but these results do not differ from our preferred regressions. Whenever 
two or more companies cover a route we compute their respective shares in terms of total frequencies 
and use this to calculate the weighted mean price for the route. We follow the same procedure for the 
average speed variable.  
We include as an explanatory variable the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures 
the level of concentration on any given route. The HHI is calculated as the sum of the shares of bus 
companies operating on the route in terms of frequencies, thus capturing the intensity of intramodal 
competition.  
Additionally, we include two dummy variables that capture the potential intermodal competition 
on a route. The first dummy is the variable train, which takes a value of one if a direct train service 
is operated on the route, and 0 otherwise. The second dummy is the variable plane, which takes a 
value of one if a direct flight connection exists on a given route, and 0 otherwise.  
                                                          
10 To convert UK pounds and Swedish krona to euros, we used the official exchange rate provided by the ECB 
on the day of research.  
11 It was an ordinary working day, the second Tuesday in the month. 
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 We also include a set of control variables that are drawn from the Eurostat database, in an attempt 
to capture the demand for bus services. To maximize accuracy, we use the lowest level of 
Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) available, that is the NUTS 3. As in all 
gravity models, we use the weighted mean values of the population at the origin and destination for 
the control variables. Typically, gravity models are used to estimate demand on interurban transport 
routes. In models of this kind, demand between two points depends positively on the economic and 
demographic size of the origin and destination, and negatively on their distance apart. Furthermore, 
we also include a variable that represents the length and speed of the services, to account for the 
quality and costs of the IBS.  
Finally, we include a list of dummy variables, corresponding to each specific country (Spain, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Sweden), which take a value of 1 whenever a route is 
completed in the corresponding country and 0 otherwise. With the inclusion of these variables we 
can compare the IBS between these countries. A possible explanation for the differences in results 
may be found in the different regulatory system operating in each country: competition in the market 
prevails in Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom, while competition for the market 
prevails in Spain.  
We estimate additional models, including as explanatory variables the interaction between the 
dummy of each country and the two most relevant continuous variables of our analysis; the GDP per 
capita and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Note that in these additional regressions we cannot 
include the dummy variables for each country and the interactions must be added separately for GDP 
per capita and the HHI. The reason is that the variation inflation factor that measures the 
multicollinearity increases to more than 10,000 for the country dummies and the interaction variables 
when they are jointly considered, so the individual identification of variables may get distorted. This 
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may be explained by the low number of observations in our sample. This is a limitation of our data 
that must be taken into account in the interpretation of results.  
All the variables, except for the dummies, are in logs. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
2.3. Empirical strategy 
The baseline equation that we estimate for the route k is as follows: 
Yk = α0 + α1log(HHIk) + α2log(lengthk)  + α3log(speedk)  + α4traink  + α5planek  + α6log(wgdpk)  +  
        α7log(wpopk)  + εk                                                                                                                                                                             (1)                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
where Yk is, respectively, log (price/kmk) and log (frequencyk). We use the set of independent 
variables to control for demand (GDP per capita = wgdp, Population = wpop), costs (length, average 
speed) and competition from alternative modes (train and plane). We also control for market 
concentration on a route (HHI).  
We also estimate additional equations to identify possible differences between IBS regulation 
systems. In a second equation, besides the above explanatory variables, we include a set of dummy 
variables corresponding to the countries analyzed. In all cases, our reference country is Spain. In the 
third and fourth equations, we include the interaction between the country dummy variables and the 
HHI and GDP per capita variables, respectively.  
We estimate the equations using the same explanatory variables through a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUREG) technique that accounts for a correlation between the error terms of the two 





3 Expected results of explanatory variables 
3.1 Price per kilometer 
In the price per kilometer regression we expect a positive sign for the coefficient of the HHI variable. 
More (less) concentrated routes should charge higher (lower) prices, as companies use their market 
power to increase prices. In the case of IBS in Ireland, Ahern and Tapley (2008) show that on routes 
where there is less competition between bus services, the prices are higher. Likewise, we expect 
population to have a positive effect on the final price per kilometer, as routes that link more populated 
cities should have more demand.  
The significance of the GDP per capita variable in the price equation is unclear. On the one hand, 
the demand for bus services may be higher in richer cities as users have more financial resources. On 
the other hand, the characteristics of bus transport, tending to be cheaper but also slower than other 
modes, could mean that the more affluent passengers prefer to use faster and more expensive transport 
alternatives, such as trains or planes. Furthermore, the price-elasticity of demand may be conditioned 
by the economic status of users. Thus, the expected effect of GDP per capita is unclear. 
As Friebel and Niffka (2009) point out, the presence of intermodal competition between railroad 
and planes has an effect on prices. We believe that intermodal competition in IBS routes can also 
lower prices. Thus, we expect the coefficient associated with the train and plane variables to be 
negative. This negative effect is expected to be especially marked in the case of rail, given that for its 
specific users this mode probably represents a better substitute for IBS than traveling by air. Indeed, 
flying, as well as being faster, is much more expensive than traveling by bus, which means these two 
transportation modes may not be direct competitors. Thus, it would not be surprising if the availability 
of a flight covering a given route has no impact on bus prices and frequencies.  
The variable length measures the distance between city pairs. The possible presence of distance 
economies would mean that this variable could have a negative impact on the price per kilometer. In 
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this regard, the same fixed costs can apply to a service with a higher output (in this case a greater 
number of kilometers). Alternatively, it might be the case that total costs increase at a rate that is less 
than proportional to distance. Note that, as buses are generally slower than other modes of 
transportation (certainly planes and usually trains), the relative competitiveness – and therefore the 
prices – of buses vis-à-vis other transportation modes may decrease with distance. 
Finally, for the average speed variable, two possible effects may emerge. A greater average speed 
leads to higher fuel consumption. In such cases, it is usual that firms transfer this cost directly to the 
users by increasing fares. Faster journeys may also be considered as “superior” services since they 
require less time, and this should also have a positive repercussion on prices.  
However, a greater average speed may also result in cost reductions. If this is the case, we would 
expect a negative relationship between these two variables. In the case of the train for instance, an 
increase in the operative speed increases both the capacity of the system and the capacity to attract 
more passengers (Freyss et al., 2013). The same could apply to the interurban bus market. Higher 
average speeds allow buses to make more journeys per day. When this is true, firms face a crucial 
cost reduction: a smaller bus fleet and fewer personnel are required to cover a route. Likewise, higher 
average speeds are likely to be related to fewer bus stops and a better infrastructure, which would 
also help reduce costs12. If higher average speeds are related to better infrastructure and roads, then 
cars represent a serious threat to the bus since they can cover the same distance in considerably less 
time. Hence, the relative competitiveness of buses decreases with faster and better routes. Thus, one 
of the most effective ways by which the bus can compete with alternative modes is via prices. The 
average IBS speed in our sample ranges from 35 to 89 km/h with a mean of 67 km/h. These values 
would strengthen the idea of a negative relationship between the two variables. 
                                                          
12 Fuel consumption is higher when the vehicle has to accelerate. Constant average speeds and a minimum 
number of stops ensure a smooth and more efficient use of fuel.  
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In those countries operating a more market-oriented regulatory framework, including the UK, 
Germany and Sweden, we expect prices to be lower than in those countries in which the market is 
more closely regulated. Preston (2001), in a study of the deregulated British system, reports that the 
price per kilometer for the urban bus is 23% lower than that in limited competition systems and 51% 
lower than in regulated systems. In our sample, only Spain has a regulatory system in which firms 
compete for the market through competitive tendering, while in the other five countries the firms 
compete directly in the market. Consequently, we expect the prices in Spain to be higher than in the 
rest of the countries. 
 
3.2. Frequency 
In the transportation sector, daily frequency is one of the key variables affecting quality. With higher 
levels of frequency, customers have more options for adapting the journey to their needs, while the 
waiting time for the next bus service is reduced.  
The variable capturing the level of market concentration (HHI) is expected to have a negative 
impact on frequency. Ellis and Silva (1998), Oldale (1998) and Gomez-Lobo (2007) all show that, in 
the bus sector, firms compete in terms of service frequencies rather than in terms of price. If this is 
the case, then we would expect daily frequency to increase with competition.  
The distance variable is also expected to have a negative effect. Demand on a route between two 
cities, according to gravity models, depends negatively on the distance between them (Anas, 1983; 
Kingsley and Fotheringham, 1984). Moreover, longer distances tend to make the bus less attractive 
in relation to other modes of transport. Finally, shorter distances allow firms to offer more journeys 
without having to increase the size of their fleet.  
The sign of the coefficient of the speed variable is expected to be positive. As discussed, higher 
average speeds allow firms to undertake more journeys per day without incurring higher costs.  
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In the case of alternative modes of transportation, two opposite effects may impact daily 
frequencies. On the one hand, the presence of alternative modes on a route means demand is split 
between different suppliers. If this is the case, the expected sign for the train and plane variables in 
the daily frequency equation should be negative. On the other hand, the presence of alternative modes 
points to a high level of demand on a route. In addition, bus firms may be required to provide more 
frequent services to compete with other modes of transport. Hence, the expected effect of alternative 
modes on daily frequency is unclear.  
Population is a good proxy for demand. Thus, we expect that higher levels of population will 
increase daily frequency of services. In contrast, the expected sign of the GDP per capita variable is, 
a priori, less clear. A positive relationship between this variable and daily frequency should be 
recorded if demand is higher on routes with richer endpoints. Yet, it might also be the case that higher 
levels of income are related to lower frequency levels. As we mention above, richer people can afford 
more expensive transportation alternatives, which means demand for IBS could be lower and hence 
frequency levels will also be lower.  
Finally, Table 1 should help us predict frequencies in the different countries analyzed. One of the 
variables included in the table is the total number of daily services offered in each country. It is readily 
apparent that two countries, France and Italy, supply a considerably lower rate of daily frequencies. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the two dummy variables identifying these two countries 
will present a negative sign. As for the rest of the countries, although there are differences in the daily 
frequency rates, we cannot tell, a priori, whether these differences are statistically significant.  
4 Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the price equation. The coefficient associated with distance is negative 
and highly significant, indicating that the longer the journey, the lower the price per kilometer. In the 
case of average speed, the results also show a negative and significant effect on prices, pointing to 
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the presence of cost reductions associated with higher average speeds. A 20% increase in the average 
speed, for example, rising from an average of 65 km/h to an average of 78 km/h, is related to a 
decrease of about 14% in the price per kilometer. Alternatively, the strategy that firms seem to adopt 
when using better, faster routes is to cut their prices so as to be able to compete with faster modes of 
transport.  
Insert table 3 about here 
The presence of train services on a route leads to lower prices per kilometer. Indeed, our results 
show that whenever a route is also covered by a rail link, prices are, on average, about 14-17% lower. 
However, this is not the case for the plane, the effect of which on bus prices is not statistically different 
from zero. This result seems to confirm that this mode of transport is not perceived by passengers and 
firms as a substitute. 
As expected, the variable HHI positively affects prices although it is not statistically significant. 
Thus, such results suggest that price competition between IBS operators is weak. Furthermore, 
weighted population behaves according to our expectations but it is only statistically significant at 
the 10% level in the equation that do not consider country dummies.  
Interestingly, the coefficient of the GDP per capita variable presents a negative sign. This indicates 
a strong, negative relationship between GDP per capita and prices. A 10% increase in the GDP per 
capita of the route’s endpoint leads to a 3-4% decrease in the price per kilometer. This result shows 
that the price setting practices of bus firms follow a regressive scheme for a service used primarily 
by low-income groups. Regarding this point, note that the estimation in the appendix confirms the 
negative relationship between prices and GDP per capita when we consider as a dependent variable 
the lowest price. 
It should be stressed that, with the inclusion of the country dummy variables, the goodness of fit 
of the regression increases significantly. The R2 value rises from 0.43 in the first equation to 0.61 
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when we include the country variables. This indicates that differences across the countries in our 
sample account for an important part of the pricing policies followed by bus firms.  
When we examine the price per kilometer in our reference country, Spain, the differences with the 
five other countries are significant. With all other variables held constant, the results show that the 
price per kilometer in Spain is between 12% and 36% higher than in the other five countries. This 
result could be a direct consequence of the regulatory system operating in Spain, where firms compete 
for the market rather than in it. On the other hand, the magnitude of the differences could mean that 
the result is capturing other unobserved country characteristics, such as different fuel prices, tax 
systems or other elements. Note here that the estimation reported in the appendix shows that 
differences between countries are less clear when we consider the lowest price.  
When we consider the interaction between HHI and the country dummy variables, we find that the 
relationship between prices and HHI is stronger for Spain than for the rest of the countries. A potential 
explanation for this result is that in those countries with competition in the market the potential threat 
of the entry of other firms may restrict the price setting behavior of incumbents, even if the HHI is 
high. In this regard, note that barriers to entry are small in economic terms in the IBS market, but in 
Spain the presence of administrative barriers neutralizes any threat of entry from potential 
competitors. Otherwise, the Spanish scheme seems to perform better in terms of regressiveness, as 
the negative relationship between prices and GDP per capita is stronger for the rest of countries.  
Table 4 shows the results of the frequency equation. The signs of the coefficients associated with 
HHI, speed, length, GDP per capita and population variables are as expected. In this regard, we find 
a strong negative relationship between the level of concentration on a route (HHI) and the level of 
frequency. In line with the previous literature, this would indicate that firms compete in terms of 
frequencies. In contrast, in the case of intermodal competition, none of the coefficients associated 
with these variables is statistically different from zero.  
19 
 
Thus, we find evidence that intermodal competition in the interurban bus market is based on prices 
while intramodal competition is based on frequencies. Indeed, the variable that measures the intensity 
of intramodal competition (the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is not statistically significant in the 
pricing equation while it is negative and statistically significant in the frequency equation. This means 
that a decrease in intramodal competition (measured by the increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index) leads to less frequency but not to higher prices. In contrast, the presence of train services on 
the route leads to lower prices but does not have a relevant effect on frequency.  
Likewise, we find that higher average speeds have a positive effect on daily frequencies, the 
associated coefficient being positive and highly significant. As discussed above, higher average 
speeds allow firms to increase frequencies without having to increase costs. If we use the previous 
example, a 20% increase in average speed leads to a 22-26% increase in daily frequency.   
As expected, the coefficient associated with the distance variable between route endpoints is also 
negative. The demand for bus services decreases with the length of the route, and so companies tend 
to offer fewer services. GDP per capita and population have a clear effect on the number of daily 
services, being indicative of the impact on demand that these two variables are likely to have. Ten 
percent increases in GDP per capita and population, at the endpoints of the route, are related to 
increases of 4 and 3% in frequencies, respectively.  
Insert table 4 about here 
Finally, when we add the country dummy variables to the equation, the signs for all the previously 
considered explanatory variables do not change. As in the price specification, the goodness of fit also 
increases considerably with the inclusion of the country dummy variables. Now the R2 value rises 
from 0.55 to 0.68.  
When comparing the daily frequency of services in Spain with that in the other five countries, the 
results show that, all other variables being held constant, Spain’s daily frequency is on average 44%, 
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41% and 23% % higher than that of France, Italy and Sweden, respectively. With respect to the UK 
and Germany, the differences are not statistically different from zero. Differences between countries 
are less marked when we consider the interaction variables. In comparison to Spain, it seems that the 
relationship between frequencies and HHI is stronger for France, Italy and, to a lower extent, Sweden. 
Thus, the intensity of intramodal competition may be higher in the latter countries. Otherwise, the 
relationship between frequencies and GDP per capita is stronger for Spain than for the 
aforementioned countries.   
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented two equations which, in combination with a dataset for several 
countries, has enabled us to identify the determinants of prices and daily frequencies in the interurban 
bus sector.  
Controlling for several explanatory factors, we find that bus fares are lower on routes with richer 
endpoints. Hence, we provide some evidence of regressive fare-setting schemes in the IBS of the 
European countries included in our analysis. In contrast, daily frequencies are higher on routes with 
richer endpoints. This suggests that lower income cities not only suffer from lower quality levels, 
measured in terms of daily frequencies, but also have to face higher prices. Consequently, the fare 
systems employed by the IBS in Europe seem to be detrimental to low-income users. The higher 
prices in poorer cities may be a consequence of lower price elasticities. Low-income groups have 
usually fewer travel options; they are less likely to own a car and air fares may not be affordable for 




To this point, note that fares are set by operators and not by the authorities. This is even the case 
for Spain where operators must adapt to a price-cap regulation. The regressive nature of the systems 
points to the need for authorities to consider to require (and even finance) certain social rebates.  
Additionally, we find that in the interurban bus market intramodal competition is based essentially 
on frequencies, while intermodal competition is based on prices. Indeed, the variable HHI that 
measures the degree of competition between bus firms is only significant in the frequency equation, 
while it does not present any effect on prices. In line with the previous literature, this suggests that 
bus firms compete in frequencies. In contrast, the presence of train services on a given route has a 
marked effect on bus prices but not on frequencies.  
We also find significant differences across the countries analyzed in terms of the setting of prices 
and frequencies. A possible explanation for these differences might lie in the differences in their 
respective regulatory systems. In the countries that have liberalized their markets, prices are lower to 
those in a country like Spain where competition is for the market.  
However, the differences in prices may also be attributable to other unobserved country 
characteristics and so further research is needed to examine the impact of the different regulatory 
models on prices and frequencies in the interurban bus market. To this end, further research could 
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Table 1. Number of routes and daily frequencies in each country 
Country Firm Num. routes % Daily freq. % Relative freq. % 
Spain Alsa 28 73.7 187 81.7   
 Socibus 3 7.9 16 7.0   
 
Grupo aut. 
Jimenez 3 7.9 7 3.1   
 Bilmanbus 2 5.3 3 1.3   
 Avanza bus 1 2.6 10 4.4   
 Daibus 1 2.6 6 2.6   
 Total 38  229    
UK National Express 19 51.4 69 13.3   
 2 firms 18 48.6 449 86.7   
 NE     258 57.5 
 Megabus     191 42.5 
 Total 37  518    
Sweden Swebus 7 28.0 18 10.78   
 2 firms 18 72.0 149 89.22   
 Swebus     93 62.4 
 Nettbus     58 38.9 
 Total 25  167    
Italy Baltour 18 72.0 25 55.56   
 Soc. Marino Srl. 4 16.0 11 24.44   
 Sais autolinee 1 4.0 2 4.44   
 2 firms 2 8.0 7 15.56   
 Baltour     5 71.4 
 Consr. Autolinee     2 28.6 
 Total 25  45    
France Eurolines 8 61.5 13 37.14   
 Megabus 1 7.7 2 5.71   
 Starshipper 1 7.7 1 2.86   
 2 firms 3 23.1 19 54.29   
 Idbus     12 63.2 
 Eurolines     7 36.8 
 Total 13  35    
Germany Flixbus 8 19.51 51 13.86   
 Eurolines 1 2.44 1 0.27   
 Postbus 1 2.44 1 0.27   
 2 firms 22 53.66 163 44.29   
 Flixbus     131 80.4 
 Postbus     32 19.6 
 3 firms 3 7.32 53 14.40   
 Flixbus     33 62.3 
 Postbus     10 18.9 
 Berlinlinenbus     10 18.9 
 3 firms 6 14.63 99 26.90   
 Flixbus     70 70.7 
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 Postbus     22 22.2 
 Eurolines     7 7.1 
 Total 41  368    
Note: ‘2 (3) firms’ indicates that there are 2 (or 3) firms providing the service. The names of the firms are shown 
below it.  
 
 
Table 2: Explanatory variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Standard Dev. Min. Max 
Service Binary variable: 1 if a service exists 
on a route, 0 otherwise 270 0.6556 0.4761 0 1 
Price/km Price per kilometer PPP of the 
earliest route 177 0.0688 0.0396 0.01037 0.20 
Frequency Daily frequency on a route 177 7.6949 9.7955 1 90 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 177 8416.8 2062.8 3979 10000 
Length Distance between the two paired 
links (km) 270 455.6 277.2 33 1466 
Speed Average speed of the route (km/h) 177 66.82 10.69 35.42 88.68 
Train Binary variable: 1 if a train covers 
the route, 0 otherwise. 270 0.7074 0.4558 0 1 
Plane Binary variable: 1 if a plane covers 
the route, 0 otherwise. 270 0.5778 0.4948 0 1 
Wgdp Weighted GDP per capita PPP, 
NUTS 3 level 270 33975 17674 16400 117094 


















Table 3. Dependent variable: Price per kilometer. Seemingly unrelated regression 
 Baseline With country 
dummies 
With interactions (country 
dummies X HHI) 
With interactions (country 
dummies X Wgdp) 
Cons 1.66 (0.86)* 1.93 (0.79)** 1.73 (0.77)** 1.81 (0.78)*** 
HHI 0.22 (0.14) 0.14 (0.13) 0.19 (0.13) 0.13 (0.13) 
Length -0.33 (0.07)*** -0.29 (0.06)*** -0.29 (0.06)*** -0.29 (0.06)*** 
Speed -0.67 (0.22)*** -0.72 (0.19)*** -0.71 (0.19)*** -0.74 (0.19)*** 
Train -0.17 (0.04)*** -0.14 (0.04)*** -0.14 (0.03)*** -0.14 (0.03)*** 
Plane -0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 
Wgdp -0.42 (0.09)*** -0.33 (0.08)*** -0.33 (0.08)*** -0.29 (0.09)*** 
Wpop 0.10 (0.05)* 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 
UK - -0.12 (0.05)** - - 
Germany - -0.23 (0.05)*** - - 
France - -0.23 (0.06)*** - - 
Italy - -0.36 (0.04)*** - - 
Sweden - -0.17 (0.05)*** - - 
UK X HHI - - -0.03 (0.01)** - 
Germany X HHI - - -0.06 (0.01)*** - 
France X HHI - - -0.06 (0.01)*** - 
Italy X HHI - - -0.09 (0.01)*** - 
Sweden X HHI - - -0.04 (0.01)*** - 
UK X Wgdp - - - -0.03 (0.01)** 
Germany X Wgdp - - - -0.05 (0.01)*** 
France X Wgdp - - - -0.05 (0.01)*** 
Italy X Wgdp - - - -0.08 (0.009)*** 
Sweden X Wgdp - - - -0.04 (0.01)*** 
N 177 177 177 177 
R2 0.43 0.61 0.61 0.61 









Table 4 Dependent variable: Daily frequency. Seemingly unrelated regression 
 Baseline With country 
dummies 
With interactions (country 
dummies X HHI) 
With interactions (country 
dummies X Wgdp) 
Cons 3.16 (1.39)** 2.83 (1.29)** 2.73 (1.27)** 2.69 (1.27)** 
HHI -1.46 (0.23)*** -1.39 (0.22)*** -1.36 (0.21)*** -1.38 (0.22)*** 
Length -0.73 (0.11)*** -0.72 (0.10)*** -0.72 (0.10)*** -0.72 (0.10)*** 
Speed 1.15 (0.36)*** 1.30 (0.32)*** 1.30 (0.32)*** 1.29 (0.03)*** 
Train 0.05 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) 0.03 (0.06) 
Plane 0.03 (0.06) 0.06 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) 
Wgdp 0.44 (0.14)*** 0.40 (0.13)*** 0.40 (0.13)*** 0.42 (0.14)*** 
Wpop 0.28 (0.09)*** 0.30 (0.09)*** 0.30 (0.09)*** 0.31 (0.09)*** 
UK - 0.003 (0.09) - - 
Germany - -0.04 (0.09) - - 
France - -0.41 (0.10)*** - - 
Italy - -0.44 (0.07)*** - - 
Sweden - -0.23 (0.09)** - - 
UK X HHI - - 0.0001 (0.02) - 
Germany X HHI - - -0.01 (0.02) - 
France X HHI - - -0.10 (0.02)*** - 
Italy X HHI - - -0.11 (0.01)*** - 
Sweden X HHI - - -0.06 (0.02)** - 
UK X Wgdp - - - 0.001 (0.02) 
Germany X Wgdp - - - -0.01 (0.02) 
France X Wgdp - - - -0.09 (0.02)*** 
Italy X Wgdp - - - -0.10 (0.01)*** 
Sweden X Wgdp - - - -0.05 (0.02)** 
N 177 177 177 177 
R2 0.55 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1. Dependent variable: price per km. 1 month in advance 
 
Earliest Lowest Highest 
Cons 1.93 (0.79)** 1.34 (0.86) 1.45 (0.81)* 
HHI 0.14 (0.13) 0.23 (0.14) -0.06 (0.13) 
Length -0.29 (0.06)*** -0.23 (0.07)*** -0.29 (0.06)*** 
Speed -0.72 (0.19)*** -0.66 (0.21)*** -0.34 (0.20)* 
Train -0.14 (0.04)*** -0.11 (0.04)*** -0.15 (0.03)*** 
Plane 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.003) 
Wgdp -0.33 (0.08)*** -0.32 (0.09)*** -0.20 (0.08)** 
Wpop 0.04 (0.05) -0.06 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 
UK -0.12 (0.05)** 0.002 (0.09) -0.03 (0.05) 
Germany -0.23 (0.05)*** -0.06 (0.06) -0.25 (0.05)*** 
France -0.23 (0.06)*** -0.10 (0.07) -0.26 (0.06)*** 
Italy -0.36 (0.04)*** -0.17 (0.04)*** -0.37 (0.04)*** 
Sweden -0.17 (0.05)*** 0.01 (0.06) -0.20 (0.06)*** 
N 177 177 177 
R2 0.61 0.46 0.59 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
 
